Bob jones university dating rules
The case was remanded to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the University's claim for a refund and to reinstate the IRS's counterclaim. giving special emphasis to the Christian religion and the ethics revealed in the Holy scriptures. The school requires its high school students to take Bible-related courses, and begins each class with prayer. Sincere adherents advocating contrary views have ventilated the subject for well over three decades. Only one month after the IRS announced its position in 1970, Congress held its first hearings on this precise issue. In view of its prolonged and acute awareness of so important an issue, Congress' failure to act on the bills proposed on this subject provides added support for concluding that Congress acquiesced in the IRS rulings of 19. Based on this interpretation, Orientals and Negroes are Hamitic, Hebrews are Shemitic, and Caucasians are Japhethitic. By stipulation, the IRS agreed to abate its assessment for 1969 and most of 1970 to reflect the fact that the IRS did not begin enforcing its policy of denying tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory private schools until November 30, 1970. Nevertheless, the two sections are closely related; both seek to achieve the same basic goal of encouraging the development of certain organizations through the grant of tax benefits. Stone, Federal Income Taxation 220-222 (5th ed.1980). [p583] C Goldsboro Christian Schools is a nonprofit corporation located in Goldsboro, N. Like Bob Jones University, it was established to conduct an institution or institutions of learning . Articles of Incorporation ¶ 3(a); Complaint ¶ 6, reprinted in App. Since its incorporation in 1963, Goldsboro Christian Schools has maintained a racially discriminatory admissions policy based upon its interpretation of the Bible. Failure of Congress to modify the IRS rulings of 19, of which Congress was, by its own studies and by public discourse, constantly reminded, and Congress' awareness of the denial of tax-exempt status for racially discriminatory schools when enacting other and related legislation make out an unusually strong case of legislative acquiescence in and ratification by implication of the 19 rulings. Equal Educational Opportunity: Hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Equal Educational Opportunity, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 1991 (1970). Administration's Change in Federal Policy Regarding the Tax Status of Racially Discriminatory Private Schools: Hearing before the House Committee on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. Nonaction by Congress is not often a useful guide, but the nonaction here is significant. there have been no fewer than 13 bills introduced to overturn the IRS interpretation of § 501(c)(3). Cultural or biological mixing of the races is regarded as a violation of God's command. As a result, the amount of the counterclaim was reduced to 6,190.99. After the Court granted certiorari, the Government filed a motion to dismiss, informing the Court that the Department of the Treasury intended to revoke Revenue Ruling 71-447 and other pertinent rulings and to recognize § 501(c)(3) exemptions for petitioners. Thereafter, the Government informed the Court that it would not revoke the Revenue Rulings, and withdrew its request that the actions be dismissed as moot. The language of the two sections is in most respects identical, and the Commissioner and the courts consistently have applied many of the same standards in interpreting those sections. To the extent that § 170 "aids in ascertaining the meaning" of § 501(c)(3), therefore, it is "entitled to great weight," at 613. 35 (1969), and described "charitable" as "a term that has been used in the law of trusts for hundreds of years." at 43. Reiling, Federal Taxation: What Is a Charitable Organization? Whatever may be the rationale for such private schools' policies, racial discrimination in education is contrary to public policy. (c) The IRS did not exceed its authority when it announced its interpretation of § 501(c)(3) in 19. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined, and in Part III of which POWELL, J., joined. The court permanently enjoined the Commissioner of [p579] Internal Revenue from approving tax-exempt status for any school in Mississippi that did not publicly maintain a policy of nondiscrimination. or educational purposes" was intended to express the basic common law concept [of "charity"]. Its purpose is "to conduct an institution [p580] of learning . giving special emphasis to the Christian religion and the ethics revealed in the Holy Scriptures." Certificate of Incorporation, Bob Jones University, Inc., of Greenville, S. Entering students are screened as to their religious beliefs, and their public and private conduct is strictly regulated by standards promulgated by University authorities. 1127 (DC 1970), the IRS formally notified the University of the change in IRS policy, and announced its intention to challenge the tax-exempt status of private schools practicing racial discrimination in their admissions policies. 725 (1974), in which this Court held that the Anti-Injunction Act of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. Thereafter, on April 16, 1975, the IRS notified the University of the proposed revocation of its tax-exempt status. housing and related facilities from which Americans are excluded because of their race, color, creed, or national origin is unfair, unjust, and inconsistent with the public policy of [p595] the United States as manifested in its Constitution and laws. In § 170 and § 501(c)(3), Congress has identified categories of traditionally exempt institutions and has specified certain additional requirements for tax exemption. 517(1) (1921), for example, the IRS's predecessor denied charitable exemptions on the basis of proscribed political activity before the Congress itself added such conduct as a disqualifying element. On the record before us, there can be no doubt as to the national policy. Clearly an educational institution engaging in [p599] practices affirmatively at odds with this declared position of the whole Government cannot be seen as exercising a "beneficial and stabilizing influenc[e] in community life," 397 U. at 673, and is not "charitable," within the meaning of § 170 and § 501(c)(3). Petitioner Goldsboro Christian Schools admits that it "maintain[s] racially discriminatory policies," Brief for Petitioner in No. 10, but seeks to justify those policies on grounds we have fully discussed. For example, the Bogerts state: In return for the favorable treatment accorded charitable gifts which imply some disadvantage to the community, the courts must find in the trust which is to be deemed "charitable" some real advantages to the public which more than offset the disadvantages arising out of special privileges accorded charitable trusts. Racially discriminatory educational institutions cannot be viewed as conferring a public benefit within the above "charitable" concept or within the congressional intent underlying § 501(c)(3). Such interpretation is wholly consistent with what Congress, the Executive, and the courts had previously declared. (d) The Government's fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners' exercise of their religious beliefs. (e) The IRS properly applied its policy to both petitioners. POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, TOP Opinion BURGER, C. Thereafter, in July, 1970, the IRS concluded that it could "no longer legally justify allowing tax-exempt status [under § 501(c)(3)] to private schools which practice racial discrimination." IRS News Release, July 7, 1970, reprinted in App. The revised policy on discrimination was formalized in Revenue Ruling 71-447, 1971-2 Cum. 230: Both the courts and the Internal Revenue Service have long recognized that the statutory requirement of being "organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . The sponsors of the University genuinely believe that the Bible forbids interracial dating and marriage. The University continues to deny admission to applicants engaged in an interracial marriage or known to advocate interracial marriage or dating. After failing to obtain an assurance of tax exemption through administrative means, the University instituted an action in 1971 seeking to enjoin the IRS from revoking the school's tax-exempt status. On January 19, 1976, the IRS officially revoked the University's tax-exempt status, effective as of December 1, 1970, the day after the University was formally notified of the change in IRS policy. And in 1962, President Kennedy announced: [T]he granting of Federal assistance for . Yet the need for continuing interpretation of those statutes is unavoidable. In other instances, the IRS has denied charitable exemptions to otherwise qualified entities because they served too limited a class of people, and thus did not provide a truly "public" benefit under the common law test. In 1970, when the IRS first issued the ruling challenged here, the position of all three branches of the Federal Government was unmistakably clear. We therefore hold that the IRS did not exceed its authority when it announced its interpretation of § 170 and § 501(c)(3) in 19. That provision denies tax-exempt status to social clubs whose charters or policy statements provide for "discrimination against any person on the basis of race, color, or religion." Both the House and Senate Committee Reports on that bill articulated the national policy against granting tax exemptions to racially discriminatory private clubs. The IRS properly denied tax-exempt status to Goldsboro Christian Schools. The form of § 170 simply makes plain what common sense and history tell us: in enacting both § 170 and [p588] § 501(c)(3), Congress sought to provide tax benefits to charitable organizations, to encourage the development of private institutions that serve a useful public purpose or supplement or take the place of public institutions of the same kind. Tax exemptions for certain institutions thought beneficial to the social order of the country as a whole, or to a particular community, are deeply rooted in our history, as in that of England.
Few social or political issues in our history have been more vigorously debated and more extensively ventilated than the issue of racial discrimination, particularly in education. There can thus be no question that the interpretation of § 170 and § 501(c)(3) announced by the IRS in 1970 was correct. providing a public benefit," at 614-615, but suggests that Congress itself fully defined what organizations provide a public benefit, through the list of eight categories of exempt organizations contained in § 170 and § 501(c)(3). 997 (1971), Fagin's school for educating English boys in the art of picking pockets would be an "educational" institution under that definition. A distinctive feature of America's tradition has been respect for diversity. The Court points out that there is a strong national policy in this country against racial discrimination. which is not disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c) (3) by reason of attempting to influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office. Making a more fruitful inquiry, the Court next turns to the legislative history of § 501(c)(3) and finds that Congress intended [p615] in that statute to offer a tax benefit to organizations that Congress believed were providing a public benefit. But then the Court leaps to the conclusion that this history is proof Congress intended that an organization seeking § 501(c)(3) status "must fall within a category specified in that section what organizations are serving a public purpose and providing a public benefit within the meaning of § 501(c)(3), and has clearly set forth in § 501(c)(3) the characteristics of such organizations. In subsequent Acts, Congress continued to broaden the list of exempt purposes. The Revenue Act of 1921 expanded the groups to which the exemption applied to include "any community chest, fund, or foundation" and added "literary" endeavors to the list of exempt purposes. (ii) An organization, such as a primary or secondary school, a college, or a professional or trade school, which has a regularly scheduled curriculum, a regular faculty, and a regularly enrolled body of students in attendance at a place where the educational activities are regularly carried on. The circumstances under which this change in interpretation was made suggest that it is entitled to very little deference. So long as the Congress has not acted to set forth a national policy respecting denial of tax exemptions to private schools, it is improper for the IRS or any other branch of the Federal Government to seek denial of tax-exempt status. Where in addition to these circumstances Congress has shown time and time again that it is ready to enact positive legislation to change the Tax Code when it desires, this Court has no business finding that Congress has adopted the new IRS position by failing to enact legislation to reverse it.
Syllabus Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (IRC) provides that "[c]orporations . But in 1970, the IRS concluded that it could no longer justify allowing tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) to private schools that practiced racial discrimination, and in 1971 issued Revenue Ruling 71-447 providing that a private school not having a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students is not "charitable" within the common law concepts reflected in §§ 170 and 501(c)(3). 81-3, petitioner Bob Jones University, while permitting unmarried Negroes to enroll as students, denies admission to applicants engaged in an interracial marriage or known to advocate interracial marriage or dating. Racially discriminatory educational institutions cannot be viewed as conferring a public benefit within the "charitable" concept discussed earlier, [p596] or within the congressional intent underlying § 170 and § 501(c)(3). [p603] As to such schools, it is argued that the IRS construction of § 170 and § 501(c)(3) violates their free exercise rights under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. 158 (1944), for example, the Court held that neutrally cast child labor laws prohibiting sale of printed materials on public streets could be applied to prohibit children from dispensing religious literature. (1959); Bogert § 369, at 65-67; 4 Scott § 368, at 2855-2856. This I am sure is no accident, for there is nothing in the language [p613] of § 501(c)(3) that supports the result obtained by the Court. Nowhere is there to be found some additional, undefined public policy requirement. The Court seizes the words "charitable contribution" and with little discussion concludes that "[o]n its face, therefore, § 170 reveals that Congress' intention was to provide tax benefits to organizations serving charitable purposes," intimating that this implies some unspecified common law charitable trust requirement. The Court would have been well advised to look to subsection (c) where, as § 170(a)(1) indicates, Congress has defined a "charitable contribution": For purposes of this section, the term "charitable contribution" means a contribution or gift to or for the use of . This, of course, is of considerable significance in determining the intended meaning of the statute. Therefore, it is my view that, unless and until Congress affirmatively amends § 501(c)(3) to require more, the IRS is without authority to deny petitioners § 501(c)(3) status.
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable . Until 1970, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) granted tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) to private schools, independent of racial admissions policies, and granted charitable deductions for contributions to such schools under § 170 of the IRC. Whatever may be the rationale for such private schools' policies, and however sincere the rationale may be, racial discrimination in education is contrary to public policy. III Petitioners contend that, even if the Commissioner's policy is valid as to nonreligious private schools, that policy cannot constitutionally be applied to schools that engage in racial discrimination on the basis of sincerely held religious beliefs. The Court's reading of § 501(c)(3) does not render meaningless Congress' action in specifying the eight categories of presumptively exempt organizations, as petitioners suggest. Yet contemporary standards must be considered in determining whether given activities provide a public benefit and are entitled to the charitable tax exemption. Charitable trust law also makes clear that the definition of "charity" depends upon contemporary standards. In approaching this statutory construction question, the Court quite adeptly avoids the statute it is construing. An entity must be (1) a corporation, or community chest, fund, or foundation, (2) organized for one of the eight enumerated purposes, (3) operated on a nonprofit basis, and (4) free from involvement in lobbying activities and political campaigns. [a] corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation . A provision of that Act provided an exemption for "corporations, companies, or associations organized and conducted solely for charitable, religious, or educational purposes." Ch. The 1909 Act provided an exemption for any corporation or association organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes, no part of the net income of which inures to the benefit of any private stockholder or individual. Prior to 1970, when the charted course was abruptly changed, the IRS had continuously interpreted § 501(c)(3) and its predecessors in accordance with the view I have expressed above. The IRS answered, consistent with its longstanding position, by maintaining a lack of authority to deny the tax exemption if the schools met the specified requirements of § 501(c)(3). Following the close of the litigation, the IRS published its new position in Revenue Ruling 71-447, stating that a school asserting a right to the benefits provided for in section 501(c)(3) of the Code as being organized and operated exclusively for educational purposes must be a common law charity in order to be exempt under that section. [p623] Petitioners are each organized for the "instruction or training of the individual for the purpose of improving or developing his capabilities," 26 CFR § 1.501(c)(3) - 1(d)(3) (1982), and thus are organized for "educational purposes" within the meaning of § 501(c)(3). There is no indication that either petitioner has been involved in lobbying activities or political campaigns.
The origins of such exemptions lie in the special privileges that have long been extended to charitable trusts.
More than a century ago, this Court announced the caveat that is critical in this case: [I]t has now become an established principle of American law that courts of chancery will sustain and protect .